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By Denis Freney
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has led 
to many conflicting views and stands. We 
must first ask why the Soviets intervened. 
Yet much o f the debate has taken place 
without any investigation or study o f  the 
evidence.
The Soviet explanation has been given 
many times. President Leonid Brezhnev on
January 14 outlined his view in an interview 
with Pravda: “ The unceasing armed 
intervention, the well-advanced plot by 
external forces of reaction created a real 
threat that Afghanistan would lose its 
independence and be turned into an 
imperialist military bridgehead on our 
country’s southern border.”
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Pravda (January 19) spelt out that “ in 
recent months, the (imperialist) aggression 
assumed such forms and scale as to 
jeopardise the very existence of the 
Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as an 
independent and sovereign state,”
The Pravda article, by A. Petrov, defines 
this aggression as “ tens of thousands of 
mercenaries, armed with foreign arms and 
trained by foreign instructors, who are sent 
into Afghanistan” . He claims that on June 
20 and 21, 1979, two Pakistani vessels 
brought arms to Karachi for the Afghan 
rebels. The first brought 2,000 tons of US- 
made weapons from Britain and the second
8,000 tons of war materials from China. The 
material was allegedly taken to Peshawar. 
This operation was supervised by CIA agent 
Louis Dupree who, with a CIA team, was 
trying to force a united front of the rebels and 
a government-in-exile.
Units of American-trained mercenaries 
were sent into Afghanistan and when they 
“were routed, proofs were obtained that 
confirmed the fact of external aggression”.
One thing should be noted: Petrov speaks 
of aggression reaching a scale which would 
have endangered Afghan independence in 
“ recent months” .
This would therefore refer to the period 
when Hafizullah Amin was president. 
Leaving aside the question, for the moment, 
of whether Amin was a “ CIA agent” , let us 
exam ine the m ilitary position  in 
Afghanistan between September and 
December 1979.
It is easily documented that the CIA, 
Pakistan and China were training and 
aiding the Afghan rebels. The question is 
rather how successful they had been in 
developing a force which would have 
been close to seizing power and which would, 
therefore, have required the presence of so 
many Soviet troops.
It must be noted, first of all, that both sides
— the American and Soviet — have a clear 
interest in showing that the rightist rebels 
did indeed pose a real threat to Kabul. The 
Soviets need to show that there was a threat 
of a new "Chile” to justify their action. The 
Americans need to show it is true, to justify 
their action. The Americans need to show it 
is true to justify their claim that the Afghan 
people were valiantly and successfully
challenging the “ communist” regime in 
Kabul.
Second, linked with the above point, we 
must be cautious in estimating sources of 
information. The various Afghan rebel 
groups are notoriously unreliable as sources 
of information. They seek to promote 
themselves over their rivals, each claiming 
great victories. This was also part of the 
bidding for aid from imperialism and China.
One of the best examples of unreliable 
information was the claim that 10,000 Soviet 
soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan in 
one week after the Soviet invasion! It is also 
true that such stories were enthusiastically 
seized upon by the sensationalist western 
media. The Americans, particularly the CIA, 
also broadcast misinformation, as the media 
have now discovered.
The ABC’s Geoff Herriot has been 
particularly strong in emphasising the 
unreliability of guerrilla sources and US 
embassy misinformation (see Sun-Herald, 
January 27 for summary of these views).
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Dr. Beverley Male, lecturer at Duntroon 
military college, an expert in Afghan affairs 
who spent some months there in early 1979, 
and who is certainly not pro-left, is even more 
definite. Dr. Male in a letter to The Bulletin 
(January 29) says that it was clear when she 
was in Kabul last year “many reports were 
based on unsubstantiated and unchecked 
rumors, the most vicious of which could 
often, regrettably, be traced to US Embassy 
sources” .
“The Taraki-Amin regime was certainly 
no worse and probably much better than 
many others that are not subjected to such a 
sustained and savage media attack,” she 
writes in The Bulletin.
We must very strongly make the point that 
there was a CIA-sponsored “disinformation” 
throughout this period. As journalists have 
since found out, this disinformation was 
highly exaggerated then as it is now. We 
must therefore sift our reports which 
uncritically report rebel or US “information 
service” sources, and to search for reports 
which are either independent first-hand 
reports, or seriously try to evaluate reports.
M ilitary situation , September-  
December 1979
Amin had, from the early ’seventies, been 
the Khalq leader respon sib le  for 
organisation within the army. When he 
seized power from Taraki in September 1979, 
it seems that the military operations of the 
army improved and that, in fact, after Amin 
took power the army broke the back of 
resistance in Pakhtia province, one of the 
main centres of the rebels. Certainly the 
position was better than six months 
previously. Pakhtia province, like the other 
major centres of revolt, is on the Pakistani 
border, was the subject of a major offensive 
by Amin’s army, and the rebels suffered a 
major defeat there.
Asia Week (December 14,1979) under the 
heading “Amin hits Back” reported heavy 
bombing of dozens of rebel villages in 
Takhar province “ seemed to turn the course 
of the 14-month-old civil war in the 
Government’s favor” . Rebels withdrew from 
several key areas in Pakhtia and 
Badakhstan provinces. The government 
recaptured Taghab, Nejrab and Wardak, 40 
kms from Kabul. Similarly the Far Eastern
Economic Review (January 25) reports “The 
Afghan forces say they were not doing too 
badly against the rebels before the coup” .
Dr. Male The Age, January 21) speaks of 
the “effectiveness”  of Amin’s policies. She 
adds: “and rebel sources admitted they were 
effective” .
Amin,after taking over from Taraki, she 
claims then, “had the authority to pursue a 
more vigorous campaign against the rebels 
and to press on with the economic and social 
reforms. He embarked on a successful 
offensive against the rebels in Pakhtia 
province and at the same time turned the 
religious propaganda against them.”
In fact, Dr. Male claims, the very success of 
Amin’s policies “probably signed his death 
warrant” , as “ once the rebellion was crushed 
there would no longer have been any need for 
a friendship treaty (with a military co­
operation clause) with the USSR” . We shall 
return later to Dr. Male’s explanation of 
Soviet intervention, as we shall also to a 
discussion of the nature of Amin’s repression 
of the rebels.
It is possible to also find references to the 
“tottering” Amin regime, but a close 
examination of these reports finds almost no 
reference (except in direct reports of highly 
doubtful rebel claims) of the danger to Amin 
coming from an imminent rebel defeat of the 
Afghan army. Rather, the danger referred to 
is from mutinies in the army itself, and 
attempts to stage coups. There were, for 
example, coup attempts in Kabul in 
November and December and mutinies in 
other centres. But such mutinies were not, of 
course, new phenomena.
In fact, successes gained by the rightist 
rebels were due almost entirely to army 
mutinies which, for example, allowed rebel 
tribesmen to capture part of Herat, the third 
largest city, for four days in March 1979.
The documentary by British TV man Nick 
Downey, screened on ABC TV’s “Four 
Comers” (February 2), was ample evidence 
that defections from the army provided the 
rebels with their strength — particularly in 
arms. But the divisive tribesmen failed 
because they did not use the army defectors. 
Downey also noted that the leader of the 
army defectors was, in fact, an officer who 
was the dBn of one of the feudal chiefs of the 
area.
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Within the army there were two factors 
operating to “purge it” . First, officers linked 
with the feudal lords naturally were against 
the land reform, and led many of the 
mutinies. This was a “self-purge”  of the old 
feudal army of its counter-revolutionary 
elements (many o f whom were also 
eliminated,once discovered,before they could 
defect). The second factor was the division 
among the different revolutionary officers, 
based upon their support for Khalq (and 
within that Taraki or Amin), or Parcham, or 
different bonapartist tendencies that 
emerged.
There is no suggestion that the revolts in 
Kabul in November and December were 
counter-revolutionary, pro-feudal revolts, 
but, on the contrary, there is evidence that 
they were launched by dissident Parcham 
and Khalq elements.
Finally, it remains the Afghan army 
which is fighting the rebels today. Abdul 
Sammat Azhar, head of the “ security 
organs” under Karmal, speaking on East 
Berlin TV “resolutely rejected allegations 
that there had been an interference by Soviet 
troops. Not a single Soviet soldier had taken 
part in such (anti-rebel security) operations 
and this would remain so in the future." 
(ADN Bulletin, No. E4, January 1980.) He 
did, however, stress that Soviet forces “are 
stationed hereto oppose any aggression from 
abroad” .
His claims are confirmed by western and 
even CIA reports that Soviet troops are not
engaged in operations against the guerrillas. 
If they are not needed now, then they were 
not needed in December for such operations, 
particularly as it is the height of winter and 
the rebel areas are snow-bound, removing 
the chance of any major rebel offensive.
D a n g e r s  o f  f o r e i g n  i n v a s i o n  o f  
Afghanistan?
Was there then a danger of US, Pakistan 
andfor C h in ese  tro o p s  in v a d in g  
Afghanistan?
This is a separate question to that of well- 
documented US, Pakistani and Chinese 
suppun for and training of the rightist 
rebels. When Azhar speaks of Soviet troops 
being present to “oppose any aggression 
from abroad” , we must assume he means 
actual invasion.
The allegations made by Petrov (quoted 
earlier), the well-documented article by 
Konrad Ege in CounterSpy (Vol. 4, No. 1) 
showing US, Chinese and Pakistani aid for 
and training of rightist guerrillas and other 
such charges, do not add up to an invasion.
The Japanese Communist Party daily 
Akahata (January 19) correspondent in 
Kabul says he waB told by the Karmal 
government that it was not under threat of 
foreign invasion when the Soviet troops 
moved in. In the Kabul press, from October to 
December 1979, before the Soviet 
intervention, the Akahata correspondent 
"found no reports on a threat of aggression
Karmal
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from outside. During my stay in Kabul, 
newspapers rarely referred to this problem” .
But, he reports, “ the Afghan authorities 
stressed that the despatch of Soviet troops 
saved the lives of many political prisoners 
(who were) liberated by the USSR. This 
statement happens to throw into relief the 
fact that not only international relations but 
also internal affairs were important reasons 
for the Soviet troops being sent in” .
Indeed, if there was no danger of f  oreign 
aggression from, necessarily, foreign troops, 
and only aid and training of the rightist 
rebels, then there is no j ustification for Soviet 
troops being present, particularly in such 
large numbers. If such imperialist aid to 
rightist forces was a justification for such 
large-scale deployment, then Soviet troops 
could go into any country in the world, 
because the CIA is active everywhere, 
including Australia.
Indeed, the Soviet leadership used similar 
excuses for the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
which was supposedly under imminent 
threat from CIA and West German 
infiltration. No doubt the CIA and West 
Germans were active, but there was no 
reason to believe that Dubcek and the Czech 
communists were not capable of defeating 
their efforts. Warsaw Pact troops quite 
clearly moved into Czechoslovakia for other 
reasons: they wanted a regime in power they 
could completely control — they did not want 
another Yugoslavia or Romania in eastern 
Europe, particularly as it was beginning a 
unique experiment in socialist democracy.
It is difficult, therefore, to accept the 
Soviet’s basic explanation for such a large- 
scale deployment of troops. WE must look 
elsewhere for the real reason.
The overthrow  o f  Amin
One does not have to look far for one 
obvious factor: the overthrow of Amin came 
only days after the massive Soviet airlift had 
begun. It is impossible to accept the Soviet 
explanation that the overthrow of Amin was 
purely a Parcham operation which they had. 
nothing to do with. Subsequent Soviet 
condemnation of Amin (including that by 
Brezhnev himself) shows they had no love 
for him. There is no sign of equanimity or 
restraint in their condemnation. They are 
also assiduously repeating the stories
coming from Karmal that Amin was a CIA 
agent, etc.
All the evidence points to the Soviets either 
directly overthrowing and executing Amin, 
or directly aiding those who did so, by 
disarming or demobilising Afghan troops 
loyal to him. Thus, either incidentally, or as a 
major reason, the overthrow of Amin and 
installation of Karmal was an objective of 
the Soviet invasion. Why should this be so, 
and did it necessitate such a massive 
presence of Soviet troops to do so?
Indeed, it is emerging from Soviet and pro­
Soviet propaganda that the overthrow of 
Amin may have been the major reason 
precisely because, they claim, he was a CIA 
agent and was about to throw the Soviets out 
and even invite American troops into 
Afghanistan. In fact, the only pro-Soviet 
allegation made of imminent invasion by 
American troops refers to the allegation that 
Amin was going to invite them in.
Jim Mitchell (The Socialist, January 30, 
1980) reported the allegations from Kabul, 
after a press conference. In summary, 
Karmal’s Interior Minister S.M. Galabzoi 
claimed to have “obtained information” that 
“on instructions from the CIA, Amin, in 
collusion with counter-revolutionaries in 
Pakistan, planned a coup to take place on 
December 29 last” . (Two days before he was 
executed by Karmal.)
They planned to execute all remaining 
“honest leaders and party activists” and 
establish a government with Amin as 
president and Gulbuddin Ekmatiar, leader of 
the rightist Islamic Party based in Pakistan, 
as prime minister. In late last September, an 
Amin emissary met with Ekmatiar. On 
October 4, Amin and his accomplice held a 
secret meeting in Kabul and endorsed the 
plan. In December, Amin’s representative 
met US special services agents in Paris, 
Rome and Karachi.
Another Amin representative went to 
Peshawar in Pakistan on December 22 and 
informed Afghan counter-revolutionaries 
that the plot was set for December 29. 
Mitchell reports: “Assurances had been 
received from American circles that 
Washington ‘if necessary’ would support the 
initiators of the coup ‘with the full might of 
the US armed forces’.”
Investigations are continuing, MitcheU
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reports, and Karmal said “ all evidence of 
Amin’s connection with the CIA will be 
produced to the world press in due course” .
The allegations of the scale of the 
massacre which Karmal claims Amin was 
planning has also escalated. Karmal 
claimed on January 23 that Amin was 
planning to massacre “half the Afghan 
population” in the period December 31 to 
January 2. This was "more terrifying than 
those that took place in Kampuchea or 
Chile,”  he said. (Le Monde, January 31.)
Any rational person must be highly 
sceptical of these claims which go alongside 
allegations that Amin was too radical, too 
harsh on the rebels, thus turning the 
population against therevolution. Moreover, 
some can still recall the Moscow Trials of the 
’thirties where similar allegations were 
made, “ con fess ion s”  obtained and 
“evidence” produced to prove that old 
Bolsheviks, leaders o f the October
Revolution alongside Lenin, were....“ Hitler
agents”.
Was Amin a CIA agent?
Who was Hafizullah Amin and does his life 
history show him as a likely CIA agent?
In August 1979, Romesh Chandra, 
President of the World Peace Council whose 
ideas for many years have exactly coincided 
with the Soviet leadership’s, had no doubts 
about Amin. Thanking Amin for his opening 
speech at a WPC-sponsored International 
Conference of Solidarity with Afghanistan 
held in Kabul from August 24-27, 1979, 
Romesh Chandra said:
“ It has been a great honour and privilege 
for us to hear the inaugural address of our 
dear Mend, comrade Hafizullah Amin. We 
have been given great new strength by his 
brilliant exposition of the situation as it now 
exists. His address has been the address of a 
man who loves his own people and who loves 
all the peoples of the world. It was the 
address of a true patriot, it was the address of 
a true internationalist. We are very grateful 
to you for your in sp irin g  w ords.”  
(Publication of WPC Information Centre, 
Helsinki.)
Leaving aside the customary hyperbole of 
Chandra at such gatherings, it is clear that
he (and the Soviet delegates present) did not 
think Amin a CIA agent then!
Similar comments in less flowery 
language can be found in other Soviet and 
pro-Soviet publications of that time.
The introduction to the WPC booklet 
reports delegates were able to move freely 
around the city and country, and replies to 
“imperialist slanders” about 75 per cent of 
the country being in the hands of rebels, etc. 
The introduction continues: “ Mr. Hafizullah 
Amin in his statements and speeches spoke 
warmly of Afghan friendship with the Soviet 
Union.”
After the conference, delegates divided 
into groups and visited Herat, Kandahar, 
Jalalabad, Kunduz, Mazare Sharif and 
Parwan, by plane or bus where they 
addressed rallies of tens of thousands (Herat 
50,000; Jalalabad 10,000; Mazare Sharif 
10,000). All the cities had been attacked by 
rebels but “calm and tranquility now prevail 
in all these areas” .
Of course, all this could be nonsense, lies 
and pure propaganda. But the source is pro­
Soviet, and there have been no reports of
similar rallies or popularity for Karmal....
not even from pro-Soviet sources. Mitchell 
can only claim “hundreds of thousands of 
toiling people are willingly co-operating in 
the new situation” .
We have no space to quote from the speech 
of Amin opening the WPC conference. 
However, the emphasis is on the socialist 
nature of the revolution. His speech is 
sprinkled with quotes from Lenin (and one 
from Brezhnev!).
Amin returned to Afghanistan in 1965 
after studying abroad at Columbia 
University in the USA, where in the mid- 
’fifties he first came into contact with 
socialist ideas. He was an alternate member 
of the PDP Politbureau formed at its 
founding conference in 1965, and quickly 
emerged as number two to Taraki in the 
Khalq faction.. He stood for the PDP in the 
elections in 1969 and won a seat in Laghman, 
a predominantly nomad area in the north­
east. Karmal was the only other successful 
PDP candidate (Fred Halliday, New Left 
Review, November-December 1978).
After Parcham played a successful role in 
bringing Daud to power in the 1973 coup,
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Khalq also began to work in the army, and 
Amin was responsible for this work. After 
the wave of repression launched by Daud in 
April 1978, it was Amin, just before his 
arrest, who managed to get orders to the 
Khalq military officers to launch the coup, 
which they did successfully on April 27. After 
the April 1978 revolution, Amin became 
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister. In July 1978 he remained in these 
posts, after Karmal was exiled. In March 
1979 he became Prime Minister, as well as 
Foreign Minister, and in July 1979 gave up 
foreign affairs and took over defence. In 
September, he became president.
He was never (as some claim) Interior 
Minister, in charge of the police, and when he 
became Defence Minister he was to “execute 
the President’s (Taraki's) directives and 
supervise the Ministry of Defence” . A 
Supreme Council for the Defence of the 
Country was formed on March 29, 1979 
which included Taraki, Amin, Watanjar 
(Defence), Mazduryar (Interior) and Major 
Yakub, chief of the general staff. The Council 
was clearly the body responsible for 
decisions on repression aimed at foiling 
conspiracies, “ eliminating traitors” , etc.
Amin then was a key figure, but not alone, 
as Taraki particularly remained in overall 
charge.
We must examine the events of September 
14, 1979, the day Amin took power from 
Taraki, to fully understand the situation.
Taraki had returned from Havana (the 
Non-Aligned Conference) and Moscow a few 
days before. All versions of the events agree 
that Amin had asked Taraki to agree to the 
dismissal of Interior Minister Watanjar and 
Border Affairs Minister Mazduryar. Taraki, 
according to most reports, was not happy 
and invited Amin to the Presidential Palace. 
Amin was suspicious and took along a 
military escort.
In the Far Eastern Economic Review 
(October 5), 1979), Rodney Tasker reports: 
‘The guards opened fire as Amin and his 
men were climbing the stairs. (This 
correspondent saw evidence o f some 
replastering on the staircase wall in the 
palace on the way to Amin’s press 
conference.)” Former Kabul police chief and 
then Taraki’s chief aide Syed Daud Tarun 
was killed in the shoot-out and given a hero’s
burial two days later by Amin who said he 
had been killed by “counter-revolutionaries” . 
Amin, according to most reports, escaped 
and returned with troops who captured the 
palace and Taraki. Watanjar and others 
escaped and Amin told Tasker he did not 
know where they were.
Fred Halliday in the New Statesman (see 
CICD “ Dossier on Afghanistan”) presents 
another version: Taraki, he claims, was 
going to arrest Amin peacefully after lunch.
Taraki did not die until early October 
when, according to Karmal, he was 
smothered to death on Amin’s orders. Others 
claim he was wounded in the shoot-out and 
died of his wounds or even died from illness 
or shock, as he was an ill man.
Many reports claimed that Taraki, in 
trying to remove Amin, was acting on 
instructions from Moscow. This cannot be 
verified, but it seems certain that Watanjar 
and other sacked ministers either were given 
refuge in the Soviet Embassy or were 
smuggled out to the Soviet Union. Some 
reports claim that Watanjar took part in the 
attack on Amin’s palace on December 27.
A fter he took power, Amin had 
consultations with the Soviet Ambassador 
and announced measures similar to those 
Karmal is now announcing: freeing political 
prisoners (60 were released in one day 
according to Tasker’s report); overtures to 
the Muslim population; an end to Taraki’s 
previous “one man rule”, etc. Amin removed 
the Ministers of Interior (Watanjar), chief of 
Agsa, the military intelligence (Assadulah) 
and Karmal’s present Interior Minister 
Gulbazoi (then Communications Minister). 
He also promised ro replace Agsa. '
Halliday claims that 4,000 Taraki 
supporters were arrested, and many of the 
military men loyal to him executed.
Th6 S ov ie t g ov e rn m e n t sen t a 
congratulatory telegram to Amin after he 
became president, but obviously all was not 
well. We will examine later the reasons for 
the coup and probable Soviet involvement. 
While Amin was, and always had been, pro­
Soviet, he was also opposed to total Soviet 
control. He told an Arab journalist on the day 
before his death that the USSR had shown it 
did not jnterfere in Afghan affairs by 
accepting his (Amin’s) veto on Soviet
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military bases in Afghanistan. (See The Age, 
January 10, a reprint of a London Sunday 
Times investigation.)
Fred Halliday (ABC Broadband, February 
11) claims from US and Afghan sources that 
Amin personally shot dead the head of the 
KGB in Kabul in December — a claim which 
is unverified by other sources, but which 
certain ly captures the mood that 
undoubtedly existed (particularly seen from 
hindsight) between Amin and the USSR.
Here it is worth returning to Dr. Beverley 
Male’s (The Age, January 21) analysis. Dr. 
Male has a very specific explanation for the 
Soviet invasion: it resulted not from a drive 
to the Gulf nor to save the country from 
Muslim rebels, but to “save” Afghanistan 
from "an independent-minded national 
communist government with no reason to 
love Moscow,”
“The effectiveness of his policies (and rebel 
sources admitted they were effective) 
probably signed his death warrant. Soviet 
involvement in the first attempt to kill him 
(by Taraki — D.F.) would have ensured that 
he never again trusted the Russians. Once 
the rebellion was crushed there would no 
longer have been any need for a friendship 
treaty (with a military co-operation clause) 
with the USSR.
“ With the increasing likelihood of US 
military intervention in Iran, as the hostage 
crisis drasLEed on, Moscow could not risk the 
abrogation of its treaty with Afghanistan 
and the expulsion of Russian advisers.
“The success of Russia’s desperate gamble 
to ‘save’ Afghanistan depends on the speed 
with which it can defeat units of the Afghan 
armed forces loyal to the previous 
government and on the readiness of the 
Peshawar-based rebels to respond to Babrak 
Karmal’s overtures .... ”
Dr, Male also claims that Afghanistan 
under Khalq was an “international liability” 
to the USSR, alarming both Iran and 
Pakistan and making more problems with 
Carter. The cost of supporting Khalq's 
revolutionary measures was too high. They 
wanted to replace Amin particularly “with 
someone less committed to the regime’s 
revolutionary objectives” .
This fits into other explanations which 
claim that Amin went too far in carrying the
Afghan army tank in Kabul during marxist coup 
of 1978
revolution forward, and was brutal and 
bureaucratic in applying measures against 
the rebels, let alone against Khalq and 
Parcham dissidents.
But before we examine the question of 
whether Amin took the revolution too fast, 
too far, too brutally, let us examine an 
accusation which is seen as a justification for 
Soviet intervention, and is linked with the 
last point: was Amin the Afghani “Pol Pot” ?
To conclude first on the accusation of him 
being a CIA agent. There is no evidence from 
his life history that this is likely. On the 
contrary, if anything, the evidence points to 
hime being a too fanatical, too devoted, and 
too brutal a revolutionary.
W a s  A m i n  t h e  “ P o l  P o t ”  o f  
A fg h a n ista n ?
The Soviet and Karmal line is that Amin 
was responsible for all the repression of the 
previous 18 months. Taraki was “clean”, a 
hero assassinated by the ruthless Amin.
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Amin was the “ Pol Pot” of Afghanistan. 
Space does not allow a long examination of 
all the evidence but we will summarise the 
main aspects regarding repression.
According to Keesing’s Archives 1978 (pp. 
29198-9) estimates put dead in the April 1978 
coup at some 3,000. About 4,500 were 
estimated imprisoned (in July 1978). Some
1,000 political prisoners held before April 
1978 were released in June and their dossiers 
burnt in public. .
In July 1979, the US State Department 
said 3,000 political prisoners had been killed, 
In August 1979, Senator Frank Church 
claimed 20,000 political prisoners and 50 
prisoners executed a day. In September 1979, 
Amnesty International claimed 12,000 in 
Kabul prisons, and the Far Eastern 
Economic Review speaks of up to 16,000 
there, and 40 a day being killed.
The Amnesty investigation began with a 
visit to Kabul by an Amnesty team in 
October 1978, followed by a discussion with 
Amin in March 1979. He was then vice­
premier and Foreign Affairs Minister. Amin 
said “72-74 women and children, members of 
the previous royal family, had been released” 
with three former ministers. He told 
Amnesty in March that there were only 100 
in Kabul’s Pul-el-Charki prison. The 
Amnesty figures are similar to the US and 
Senator Church’s figures provided before. 
Even if we accept the highest figure o f20,000 
in prison in August, and add on the 4,000 
allegedly arrested by Amin while president, 
how do these figures compare with Pol Pot’s 
massacres?
We must also recall the total situation. In 
March 1979 for example the rebels seized 
Herat after an army mutiny. According to 
the Washington Post (quoted in CounterSpy, 
op. cit.), the rebels massacred 5,000 in four 
days. Amnesty claimed the government 
jailed 1,000 after retaking Herat, others 
claim 1,000 were killed in a “red terror” .
Similar massacres occurred on a smaller 
scale wherever the rebels seized villages or
towns. The country was in a state of civil war 
at least until August when heavy reprisals 
had seriously weakened the guerrillas.
Even 20,000 is not a high figure for those in 
prison in such a situation, no matter how 
much it is to be deplored. Yet when Karmal 
came to power he found only 4,000 in Kabul
prison, and released 2,000 of them. Far 
Eastern Economic Review claimed there 
were only 2,000 there in prison on December 
28.
Karmal later claimed (Le Monde, January 
31) to have released 15,000 political 
prisoners, but there is no independent 
verification of this figure. Whatever the 
truth, the repression does not add up to a Pol 
Pot massacre.
Second, who was responsib le  for 
repression? As we already noted, Amin was 
never Interior Minister. He was only one of a 
number with overall responsibility for 
repression on the Supreme Council for the 
Defence of the Country set up in March 1979, 
at the peak of rebel activity. When he took 
power in September 1979, one of his enemies 
was the head of the secret police. If Amin did 
emerge as the “ strong man” in July 1979, he 
alone did not share the responsibility for the 
repression.
In the new Karmal government on the 
other h and, the former head of secret police is 
now Deputy Prime Minister, and the three 
former Interior Ministers Watanjar, 
Mazduryar and Nur are in Karmal’s cabinet 
in prominent positions. And Taraki, as 
“father of the revolution” , exercised real 
power at least until July 1979.
Moreover, no ministers purged under
Taraki and Amin were executed and many of
them are now in Karmal’s cabinet. This is 
not exactly the style of an Afghan Pol Pot.
Indeed, Karmal can only claim that Amin 
would have been worse than Pol Pot if  the
alleged massacre of “ half the population” 
had not been stopped by Amin’s overthrow
and execution.
It is not my intention to whitewash Amin. 
He certainly played a role in the constant
factionalism and purges that affected the
regime. He at least shared responsibility for
the many mistakes and unnecessary
repression and bombing of villages, etc.
It is even possible that he was the harshest
of all previous leaders, although I do not
regard that as proven: Taraki certainly was
no angel, and we can ask what is the fate of
pro-Am in forces (w hich  were not
inconsiderable) after Karmal took over.
Thus, it is difficult to believe that the
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Soviet moved into Kabul in such strength 
simply to remove Amin for humanitarian 
reasons, as is suggested by the Akahata 
report previously quoted.
Moreover, the Soviet leadership has shown 
no such humanitarian concern over the 
much more brutal regime of Ethiopia’s 
Mengistu.
Next, let us briefly examine the argument 
that the Soviet intervened because Amin had 
taken the revolution forward too fast, too far, 
and too brutally. Again, if the revolution did 
go too fast, etc., then it was not only Amin's 
responsibility. Taraki in his many public 
statements endorsed the rapid land reform 
and so on. If there were mistakes (as seems 
certain) in carrying out the land reform 
without providing the necessary back-up in 
terms of seed, finance, equipment (previously 
supplied by the feudal lords) then it was the 
responsibility of all the previous leadership, 
many of whom are in Karmal’s government. 
In addition, there has been no suggestion 
that Karmal is slowing down the land 
reform. Rather, he is attempting to reconcile 
Islamic feelings by going to prayers, etc., 
admittedly something Amin does not appear 
to have done.
It is true that Amin promised after taking 
power last September that journalists could 
“expect the expansion and deepening of the 
revolution” . (Far Eastern Economic Review, 
October 5,1979.) It is also true he stepped up 
the previous policy of bombing of rebel 
villages (but that still continues under 
Karmal),
Fred Halliday (New Left Review, 
November-December 1978) stressed a point 
that it is hard to contest: that the success of 
the revolution depended in large part on a 
land reform that would win the peasants to 
the revolution. In his New Statesman 
articles he appears rather to retract that, and 
argue that the land reform was too rapid. 
However, the contradiction is clear, in terms 
of survival of the revolution. Beginning from 
an urban base, it had to quickly win support 
from the peasants. In some areas it was 
successful, as Salamat Ali reports (Far 
Eastern Economic Review, October 19,1979) 
in an article which earned him one year’s jail 
from Zia. Salamat Ali reports that the 
Baluch minority in southern Afghanistan 
had welcomed the land reform, and that their 
Pushtun landlords had fled to Pakistan's
Afghan guerrilla watches from the heights
Baluchistan province. No doubt similar 
stories could be told in other, particularly 
minority, areas where the landlords tended 
to be from the previous Push tun-speaking 
aristocratic elite.
In other areas, intimidation by feudal 
gangs, the failure to provide back-up 
facilities and Islamic propaganda had their 
effects, particularly in Pushtun strongholds 
on the Pakistan border.
If one reason the USSR did move in was to 
moderate the revolution, as Dr. Male also 
suggests, then they miscalculated, as they 
have succeeded rather in whipping up 
nationalist feeling against themselves. Any 
hope of installing a Husak-style regime 
will be difficult to realise and such a plan 
would be unlikely to succeed, (That is, to 
instal, as they did after the invasion of 
Hungary, a liberal regime.)
Personally, I find it hard to see this as a 
major reason for the intervention. Similarly, 
itis difficultto imagine that the fear of unrest 
in the central Asian Soviet Muslim republics 
was a reason. First, there are very few signs 
of such discontent and, second, Afghanistan 
is hardly a model. Living standards in Soviet 
Central Asia are much, much higher than in 
Afghanistan, as are educational standards.
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In fact, one reason the Soviet leadership 
seems deliberately to be sending soldiers 
from Central Asia to Afghanistan is 
precisely to inoculate them against any 
illusions of how great life is there!
Iran — a reason for intervention in 
Afghanistan?
Dr. Male and others suggest American 
threats to Iran was a reason for intervention. 
That is, to give evidence to Carter that the 
Americans would not be allowed to invade 
Iran with impunity. Certainly, Carter was 
making dark threats just before the Soviet 
intervention to blockade Iran’s ports and 
even to invade, after the hostages were 
taken. He continues to do so. But the Soviet 
intervention has given hope to Carter that 
the Iranian leadership will see the USSR as 
the main threat, given its invasion of a 
Muslim country, rather than the USA, and 
that the hostages crisis can be solved, 
particularly by the new president Bani Sadr.
Thus, Soviet intervention has helped 
Carter’s manoeuvres in Iran, rather than 
hindered them.
It is true, however, that an evident factor 
in the Soviet decision to intervene was the 
weakened position of imperialism world­
wide, particularly following its defeat in 
Indochina. However, such calculations fail 
to take account of Carter’s long-standing 
determination to “ relegitimise” Viet Nam- 
style intervention.
The main purpose of this article has been 
to examine the explanations given for Soviet 
intervention. We, of course, completely reject 
any talk of long-term Soviet “drive for the 
Persian Gulf’ , to seize its oil resources, etc. 
Articles I have written in Tribune cover these 
and other similar extreme rightist 
explanations, which no one believes, other 
than the paranoid right. Nor is it in the 
compass of this article to examine such 
questions as the right of self-determination, 
non-interference in other country’s affairs 
etc. Eric Aarons in Tribune (January 23, 
1980) has touched on these questions.
Why, then, did the Soviet leadership 
intervene so massively in Afghanistan? It is, 
of course, still too early to give definitive
answers to this question, particularly as we 
have so far no answers from the pro-Amin 
side. Maybe we never will.
In any case, I would personally opt for the 
obvious reason: they mainly intervened to 
get rid of Amin. For those who think it is 
impossible for the Soviet leaders to accept 
such risks and odium from public opinion for 
such a reason, we need only recall Soviet 
intervention in Czechoslovakia and 
H ungary. For the Soviet leaders, 
Afghanistan after April 1978 was in the 
same situation as eastern Europe. It was no 
longer a “Finland”. For the Soviet leaders, 
the risks they have taken were worth it to 
keep Afghanistan completely loyal to them. 
They were not prepared to risk seeing Amin 
transform Afghanistan into a central Asian 
"Yugoslavia” .
In that sense, it was a defensive action 
given the Soviet leaders’ view of what 
Afghanistan had already become after April 
1978. But it is equally totally to be 
condemned.
We must, of course, (as Tribune has) 
concentrate on the way Carter and Fraser 
are using Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 
to step up the Cold War and endanger world 
peace. But that does not mean we must 
ignore examination of Soviet action, nor fail 
to condemn it in an appropriate fashion.
